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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 09-3924 
___________ 
 
ANDREAS SURYANTO, 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
____________________________________ 
 
Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A095-846-410) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Donald Ferlise 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 4, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed   January 6, 2011 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Petitioner Andreas Suryanto petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals= (ABIA@) September 24, 2009 order denying his second 
motion to reopen immigration proceedings.  For the following reasons, the 
petition for review will be denied. 
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I. 
Suryanto is a native and citizen of Indonesia who entered the United States 
on September 15, 2001, on a B-2 visitor=s visa.  On September 15, 2002, he 
applied for asylum on the ground that he was persecuted in Indonesia as an 
ethnic Chinese Christian.  On March 10, 2004, following a merits hearing, an 
Immigration Judge (AIJ@) denied Suryanto=s applications for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (ACAT@), but 
granted him a 60-day voluntary departure period.  Suryanto filed an appeal to the 
BIA challenging the IJ=s decision.  The BIA dismissed his appeal without opinion. 
 Suryanto then filed a timely petition for review.   
Meanwhile, on May 25, 2007, Suryanto married a United States citizen.  
We subsequently ordered that Suryanto=s case be held in abeyance pending the 
adjudication of Suryanto=s Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130).  On December 
10, 2007, his I-130 relative visa petition was approved.  On July 23, 2008, 
Suryanto filed a motion to reopen and remand his administrative proceedings to 
adjust his status.  On October 16, 2008, the BIA denied the motion.  On October 
30, 2008, Suryanto filed a petition for review of the BIA=s October 16, 2008 
decision.  See C.A. No. 08-4342.  We ordered that this case be consolidated for 
disposition with his previously-filed case (C.A. No. 06-1424).  On October 22, 
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2010, we denied both petitions for review.  See Suryanto v. Att=y Gen., 2010 WL 
4146155, at *4 (3d Cir. Oct. 22, 2010).   
On August 17, 2009, following the two deadly hotel bombings in July 2009, 
in Jakarta, Indonesia, Suryanto filed a motion to reopen and remand based upon 
alleged changed country conditions in Indonesia.  In support of his motion 
Suryanto submitted: (1) a web article from CNN.com reporting on the bombings; 
(2) the U.S. Department of State 2008 Human Rights Report for Indonesia; (3) 
the U.S. Department of State 2008 International Religious Freedom Report; and 
(4) an August 11, 2009 article from AsiaNews.it discussing remarks by 
Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono that Indonesia may face more 
terrorist attacks.  A.R. 16-44.  On September 24, 2009, the BIA denied the 
motion to reopen.  The BIA found that the motion was both time and number 
barred under 8 C.F.R. ' 1003.2(c)(2).  In addition, the BIA found that Suryanto=s 
Aconclusory claim of changed country conditions@ did not satisfy the exception to 
the timely filing requirement because it did not comply with the evidentiary 
requirements of 8 C.F.R. ' 1003.2(c)(1).  A.R. 3.  The BIA did not otherwise 
discuss its conclusion or specifically address any piece of evidence submitted by 
the petitioner. 
Suryanto=s timely petition for review of the BIA=s September 24, 2009 
decision is now before the Court.       
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II. 
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. ' 1252, which grants federal courts of 
appeals jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA.  We review the BIA=s denial 
of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion, see Ying Liu v. Att=y Gen., 555 
F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009), and review its underlying factual findings related to 
the motion for substantial evidence.  Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  The BIA=s denial of a motion to reopen may be reversed only if the 
decision is Aarbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.@  Rranci v. Att=y Gen., 540 
F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).   
Motions to reopen must generally be filed with the BIA no later than 90 
days after the date of the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to 
be opened.  See 8 C.F.R. ' 1003.2(c)(2); see also Shardar v. Att=y Gen., 503 
F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007).  However, Athe 90-day limitation does not apply if 
the movant seeks reopening >based on changed circumstances arising in the 
country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if 
such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been 
discovered or presented at the previous hearing.=@  Zheng v. Att=y Gen., 549 F.3d 
260, 265 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 8 C.F.R. ' 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)).   
III. 
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The issue before us is whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying 
Suryanto=s motion to reopen based on changed country conditions without 
explicitly addressing the evidence offered by the petitioner.1  Suryanto argues 
that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to consider the documentation he 
submitted in support of his motion to reopen.  He relies on Zheng v. Attorney 
General, in which we found that the BIA abused its discretion by denying a 
petitioner=s motion to reopen without identifying or discussing all of the petitioner=s 
relevant evidentiary support.  549 F.3d at 268-69.   
Suryanto is correct that the BIA is required to Aactually consider the 
evidence and argument that a party presents.@  Id. at 266 (quoting Abdulai v. 
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001)).  However, this mandate does not 
require that the BIA Aexpressly parse or refute on the record each individual 
argument or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner.@  Id. at 268 (quoting 
Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006)).  In particular, the BIA is not 
                                                 
1 
 The BIA correctly determined that Suryanto=s August 17, 2009 motion to 
reopen was numerically barred, because Suryanto had previously filed a motion 
to reopen on July 23, 2008.  See 8 C.F.R. ' 1003.2(c)(2).  In addition, the BIA 
correctly concluded that Suryanto=s motion to reopen was untimely.  The BIA 
issued a final order of removal in this case on July 25, 2005.  Suryanto=s second 
motion to reopen was filed over four years later on August 17, 2009, clearly 
beyond the ninety day limitation set forth in 8 C.F.R. ' 1003.2(c)(2).  Further, 
because Suryanto=s brief fails to address these findings, it appears that Suryanto 
has waived these issues on appeal.    
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required to address evidence that is plainly immaterial.  What is required is that 
the BIA consider all relevant evidence and provide an adequate basis from which 
we are able Ato discern its reasons for declining to afford relief to a petitioner.@  
Id.; see also Huang v. Att=y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 391 (3d Cir. 2010) (remanding 
where BIA failed to consider evidence that was both material and previously 
unavailable); Guo v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding an 
abuse of discretion where the BIA failed to consider documents that were 
Aself-evidently material@); Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the BIA has a duty to explicitly consider country conditions evidence 
that Amaterially bears on his claim@) (emphasis added).  The burden is on the 
petitioner to prove that the BIA did not review the record or consider material 
evidence.  See Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 550. 
Suryanto has not met that burden here.  The BIA denied Suryanto=s 
motion to reopen because he failed to Acomply with the evidentiary requirements 
of 8 C.F.R. ' 1003.2(c)(1) as to the conclusory claim of changed country 
conditions.@  A.R. 3.  This regulation holds that a motion to reopen Ashall not be 
granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is 
material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented 
at the former hearing.@  8 C.F.R. ' 1003.2(c)(1).  Although the four documents 
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Suryanto submitted were not available at the time of his previous hearing, they 
are plainly immaterial to his claim that the July 2009 bombings in Jakarta have 
created changed country conditions for the petitioner.  The two U.S. State 
Department reports Suryanto includes were published in 2008 and therefore 
demonstrate nothing about whether conditions in Indonesia changed following the 
bombings in 2009.  The two internet articles he submitted attest to the fact of the 
bombings and the President=s anticipation that Indonesia may face more terrorist 
attacks in the future, but do not explain how the bombings are relevant to 
Suryanto or to his underlying asylum claim, which is based on his status as an 
ethnic Chinese Christian.  There is no indication in the materials that the 
bombings were targeted at Christians in Indonesia, or that conditions in Indonesia 
had deteriorated in such a way that would provide a renewed ground for 
Suryanto=s asylum claim.  The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 
Suryanto=s evidence did not comply with 8 C.F.R. ' 1003.2(c)(1) because it did 
not meet the requisite standard of materiality.  Suryanto has failed to 
demonstrate otherwise.  See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 
2002) (stating Athe prima facie case standard for a motion to reopen . . . requires 
the applicant to produce objective evidence showing a >reasonable likelihood= that 
he can establish [that he is entitled to relief]@).   
IV. 
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Based on the foregoing, we will deny the petition for review.  
